Does science need regulation: ethos and self-organisation in science?

Abstract

This article addresses the analysis of new challenges facing science that necessitate a reassessment of scientists’ social responsibility and a revision of conventional perceptions of scientific ethics. Science is not only a body of knowledge with a profound impact on societal transformation but also a self-organized community that establishes both explicit behavioral norms and prescriptions, as well as implicit, affectively charged values and constraints. The growth in the number of scientists and publications, alongside a simultaneous decline in public trust in science, compels a rethinking of the traditional understanding of the scientific ethos and the search for ways to refine its norms through self-regulation. To this end, the article examines the relationship between scientific self-regulation and the scientific ethos, explores the origins of self-organized science, and raises questions about trust in authorities and experts. The scientific ethos, understood as a set of values and norms that govern scientists’ behavior (Robert Merton) and intended to enhance the efficiency of scientific activities, is increasingly formalized. At the same time, the lack of a clearly defined subject in science exacerbates the issue of social responsibility, especially given the trend toward the commodification (commercialization) of science. The article discusses the key factors and effectiveness of self-regulation tools – such as scientometrics, retraction practices, coordination among scientists, and the meritocratic organization of the academic community – and highlights the mismatch between traditional norms of the scientific ethos and the values of science in the context of its recent transformations. This mismatch generates potentially destructive tendencies, as the traditional approach under new conditions fails to address emerging challenges effectively. This issue is illustrated through the internal conflict of the norm of academic integrity, which encourages researchers to prioritize quantitative scientometric indicators of success, in opposition to the ethical norm of disinterestedness. I argue that the unresolved tension between these norms harms science as a whole due to the specific nature of its organization, not merely undermining the reputation of individual scientists. Finally, the article examines trust, knowledge, and values as key factors in scientific self-regulation.