On the Problem of Truth and Certainty in Epistemology: a Conceptual Consideration
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31874/2309-1606-2025-31-2-10Keywords:
truth, certainty, cogito, a priori, scepticism, fallibleAbstract
Relevance. The two central and interrelated issues in epistemology are the problem of truth and the problem of certainty. These have occupied the interest of philosophical debate whether human beings can know anything with absolute certainty and what it means for a belief or statement to be true. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the problem of possibility of truth and certainty as the challenges of epistemic justification in the contemporary epistemology. Methods. The ultimate level of knowledge is certainty, which demonstrates that a claim is epistemic true and significant if it is free from error. It is asserted that a propositional claim has a real, justified epistemic characteristic if it can be proven to be true. In this view, certainty is frequently explained in terms of undeniable truth, as in Descartes’ formulation of “I think therefore I am”. Empiricists Locke and Hume argue that knowledge comes from sensory experience which is fallible. Kant buttressed further that our knowledge begins with experience; it is structured by the mind’s a priori categories. He submitted that certainty exists in the realm of phenomena (what appears to us), not noumena (things-in-themselves). In the contemporary perspective, according to Popper, all human knowledge is subject to error and revision and what counts as certain depends on the context of inquiry. Novelty. If people are motivated by truth solely for its own sake, then this argues that any further goals for which they might desire truth must be outside the realm of epistemology. Conclusion. The challenge in epistemology is reconciling subjective conviction with objective truth. Therefore, the most important pillars required for proving the cogency of a knowledge claim in an epistemic justification as truth and certainty.
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