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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31874/2309-1606-2025-31-2-10>**Funmilayo Arinola Ade-Ali****On the Problem of Truth and Certainty in Epistemology: a Conceptual Consideration**

Relevance. *The two central and interrelated issues in epistemology are the problem of truth and the problem of certainty. These have occupied the interest of philosophical debate whether human beings can know anything with absolute certainty and what it means for a belief or statement to be true. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the problem of possibility of truth and certainty as the challenges of epistemic justification in the contemporary epistemology.*

Methods. *The ultimate level of knowledge is certainty, which demonstrates that a claim is epistemic true and significant if it is free from error. It is asserted that a propositional claim has a real, justified epistemic characteristic if it can be proven to be true. In this view, certainty is frequently explained in terms of undeniable truth, as in Descartes' formulation of "I think therefore I am". Empiricists Locke and Hume argue that knowledge comes from sensory experience which is fallible. Kant buttressed further that our knowledge begins with experience; it is structured by the mind's a priori categories. He submitted that certainty exists in the realm of phenomena (what appears to us), not noumena (things-in-themselves). In the contemporary perspective, according to Popper, all human knowledge is subject to error and revision and what counts as certain depends on the context of inquiry.*

Novelty. *If people are motivated by truth solely for its own sake, then this argues that any further goals for which they might desire truth must be outside the realm of epistemology.*

Conclusion. *The challenge in epistemology is reconciling subjective conviction with objective truth. Therefore, the most important pillars required for proving the cogency of a knowledge claim in an epistemic justification as truth and certainty.*

Keywords: truth, certainty, cogito, a priori, scepticism, fallible.

Introduction

This essay looks at numerous issues that attract debates on the conviction that knowledge is indubitable and certainty as the state of being free from doubt. **The purpose** of this paper is to discuss the problem of possibility of truth and certainty as the challenges of epistemic justification in the contemporary epistemology.

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Methods

Truth is generally understood as a property of statements, beliefs or propositions that correspond to reality. The requirement that a statement must meet in order to be true is known as the truth condition. The second of three requirements of knowledge – the tripartite conditions of knowledge – that a claim must satisfy before its assertion can be deemed true or incorrect is the truth condition. According to Plato's three requirements for knowledge, this criterion is explicitly stated in *Theaetetus*. For instance, the truth requirement for the statement "Snow is white" asserts the existence of the substance "Snow which is white". In the same token, the truth condition of 'Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded' is that Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded [Blackburn 2005: 370]. This debates whether this component renders truth conditions ineligible to serve as the focal point of a substantive theory of meaning. This means that the truth-conditional is useful since it enables one to employ a statement's meaning in a web of inferences.

The term "truth" means in general some kind of agreement between thought and its object, between knowledge and that which is known [Wallace 1979]. In an ontological sense, truth sometimes applies to objects that are asserted to be true. In reference to speech, truth is about the veracity or truthfulness of a statement, and it is exact when a person expresses what is in his mind [Wallace 1979]. In this context, it is important to understand that the word's basic meaning refers to intellectual truth, or the truth of thought, as opposed to the derived ideas of truth of existence and truth of speech. In other words, truth is not found in speaking, but rather in the context of thought. In this meaning, truth is a quality of intellectual knowing and is defined as a thing's sufficient intellectual justification. Since knowledge is frequently used in accordance with truth, truth may exist in accordance with knowledge, including simple perception and sensory knowledge. The intuitive contact of the senses with their proper objects guarantees and validates the validity of sense knowledge [Wallace 1979].

Epistemologists frequently set the objectives of finding the truth and averting mistake. This objective appears to be particularly important to epistemologists. The establishment of evidence in epistemic evaluation is known as epistemic justification. In epistemology, justification is a component of reaching certainty. In epistemology, it is a tool to achieve a goal. Most often, beliefs are assessed in a variety of ways. Even if someone may fervently maintain a certain belief as true, epistemological justification differs from these viewpoints. Epistemic evaluation is undertaken from what we might call "the epistemic point of view" [Marian 2001]. This is accomplished by emphasising truth and minimising falsehood throughout a broad spectrum

of ideas. To this purpose, a belief must receive a high sense of evaluation in regard to the applicable justificatory criterion in order to be considered justified. Thus, any concept of epistemic justification is a concept of kind of condition that is desirable or commendable from the standpoint of the aim at maximizing truth and minimizing falsity [Alston 1985].

Given the foregoing, cognitive ability endows individuals with the potential for believing and a distinct sense of reaching the truth. In the pursuit of knowledge in epistemology, the objective of understanding the truth and avoiding mistakes is accomplished. This is so because we want our beliefs to precisely and appropriately represent the world. The point is that, the basic role of justification is to establish truth and attainable mediating link between our subjective starting point and objective good [Steup 2001]. If epistemic justification does not significantly raise the chance of truth and deters questionable statements, it is ineffective. The primary cognitive goal of truth is what sets justification's major traits apart. Given that, one's cognitive endeavours are or will be justified only to the extent that they are aimed at achieving this cognitive goal by means of achieving all and only those beliefs that one has good reason to think are true [BonJour 1985]. With reference to sentences, statements, and propositions, it is the way we think of them being true or false, we also speak of *beliefs* (and other propositional attitudes) being true or false [Honderich 2005: 926].

Presentation of the main research results

The Nature of Truth

The correspondence theory and the coherence theory of truth have historically been the two basic conceptions of truth. These truth-related theories are propositional truth theories. This means that both theories make the claim that truth is a quality of propositional assertions. Additionally, they describe the modal conditions under which a claim or statement can be true. The correspondence theory of truth holds that a proposition or judgement is true if it corresponds with fact or objective reality, to use the technical language employed by philosophers. For instance, if someone asserts that "it is raining outside", this assertion would be true if the weather report is accurate at that moment. In other words, a statement is accurate if it matches reality, and it is unreliable otherwise. What is declared to be true about the world, in fact, must depend on how the world is. This simple observation appears to offer strong intuitive support to one of the major philosophical accounts of truth according to which propositions are true if and only if they correspond with the facts [Honderich 2005: 178]. According to the theory, a proposition must satisfy both of the following two requirements in order to be true: (i) that it is a fact that p, and (ii) that the assertion 'p' corresponds to that fact.

If and only if p is a fact, then ' p ' is logically true. Therefore, all that is necessary in terms of correspondence is that there should be a fact for each true assertion. In light of this, the diminished equivalence is nevertheless significant if, as the theory suggests, the link of a true proposition with a reality is viewed as an association of words with the real world. Fadahunsi [Fadahunsi 1998: 33] posits that the problem of truth has been one of the major issues in epistemology from Aristotelian period. It is necessary to ask, "What is truth?" in order to adequately justify the validity of the many sorts of claims. Truth is posited "as an important concept in philosophy because our knowledge of the world largely depends on the ability to prove that bodies of knowledge are not just bundles of falsity" [Honderich 2005: 179]. Since no one is certain or can claim that one criterion or another best represents the state of affirming the truth in epistemology, the problem of "truth" is highly theoretical.

Even though "fact" is unsuited to serving as one of the terms of this relation, the idea that truth consists in a relation between words and realities is unlikely to be abandoned. What other shape could that relationship take? There is no doubting that our words cling to material objects in a variety of ways, but the important thing is that the provided proposition's idea of a relation transcends any that it might present as a matter of its own internal structure. For example, the assertion that "insulin is a hormone" gives us a relation of predication, "is a hormone" which depends on what is meant by "insulin". This claim is true if and only if the relation is true, or, more specifically, if and only if the substance known as "insulin", which can be found in the world, is a hormone. This shows that anything the supposed relation of correspondence might achieve has already been provided for without going beyond the relation which is affirmed with the affirmation of the proposition itself [Honderich 2005: 179].

The correspondence theory of truth, however, prompts the following two queries: How can we tell if our theories match reality? The essence of the correspondence theory is called into doubt by this first query because the assertion and the reality it corresponds to are distinct from one another. The next thing to consider is how closely the statement or proposition matches reality. It is clear that this connection theory introduces some ambiguity by its very nature. According to an earlier iteration of the correspondence theory of truth, our ideas are true when they perfectly replicate or concur with the object that possesses the same obscurity. Our theories are mental or psychological, but the thing being verified is physical.

How mental concept can be exact replicas of the actual item is the second query. The more recent iteration of the correspondence theory of truth offers some solace by claiming that assertions, not concepts, are what reality corresponds to. A theory of propositional truth known as the coherence theory

of truth uses the consistency and coherence of the system of assertions to prove the truth of those propositions. A statement is only true in the context of a system of statements that are both consistent and non-contradictory. In a coherence theory of truth “a statement is true if it ‘coheres’ with other statements and it is false if it does not” [Honderich 2005: 148]. As a result, the coherence theory defines a proposition’s truth as its systematic consistency with the entire system of true statements. A statement is therefore true if it agrees with this theory of truth. The question of how our system of propositions is genuinely true is further raised by this. The issue of the truth criterion is raised by this query.

The Criterion of Truth

As we have mentioned, the correspondence and coherence theories of the nature of propositional truth both pose the criteria problem. What standard may we use to judge whether our claims are true? There have been numerous solutions to this issue throughout history. The criteria that have been put up to address this issue with the truth criterion are listed below.

1. Social Criteria:

i. **Custom:** The behavioral patterns of a group’s members, such as folkways, conventions, and many more, are known as customs. These are contrasted with the conduct patterns of the individual and the random group. While norms are morally and minimally enforced, folk ways are collective behavior patterns that are unenforced yet naturally passed down from generation to generation. Convention further means involving some forms of human agreement (either explicit or, interestingly, implicit) to facilitate a common end [Honderich 2005: 176]. But because customs differ from one group to another, they cannot serve as a yardstick for reality. Which group’s traditions are to be used as the standard, then? Because custom is a relative concept, it cannot provide a solution to this question.

ii. **Tradition:** Tradition is similar to customs, however it refers to the long-standing practices of the community. It is the customs and behaviors of a certain group of people. Tradition cannot be a set of acceptable standards for what is true because they contradict and some are erroneous and weak. For example, it was long believed that the earth was flat, but that belief has been disproven.

iii. **Consensus Gentium:** This phrase refers to universal agreement. What everyone, everywhere, constantly believes to be true is actually true. The challenges that tradition encounters as a standard of truth are also faced by this catholic (universal) criterion. Despite being a long-held and nearly universal opinion, it does not necessarily imply truth.

iv. **Authority:** It is virtually unanimously acknowledged that there is a need for authority because no one person can be an expert in every field. However, the decision of which authority to believe arises when authorities

differ. Even when they agree, one must still decide whether to believe them, and this decision is based on something other than authority. To evaluate whether the authority is reliable, the source must be cross-examined. The assertion of authority by itself does not establish its veracity.

2. Psychological Criteria:

i. **Instinct:** It is automatic, ingrained behavior that happens without thought. It is a natural manner of doing, thinking, or feeling. It is an innate quality that cannot be taught. It is a natural desire or tendency that makes you want to act in a particular way. It can be related to innate ideas, that is, the ideas that exist in the mind without having been derived from previous experience [Honderich 2005: 435]. Plato held that all of our ideas are innate, although we do not clearly grasp them as learning consists of remembering these ideas and we develop a clearer understanding of them through the process of Socratic questioning and dialectic [Honderich 2005: 435]. There is a close relation between a philosopher's views on innate ideas, a priori knowledge, and necessary truths. Rationalists typically hold that the mind has a set of innate ideas that provide the source of a priori knowledge of a wide variety of necessary truths. Empiricists deny that there are innate ideas and limit a priori knowledge and our grasp of necessary truths to pseudo and propositions to mere arbitrary definitions of words.

ii. **Sense Perception:** The sensory (as opposed to conceptual) portion of the perceptual process is typically referred to as the sensory part of perception, or sense perception. For example, when hearing a concert, the sensation is the conscious auditory event that occurs before the perceiver's thoughts and beliefs are triggered. There are many more sensory-like events that are typically categorized as sensations in addition to the sense-perceptions (visual, auditory, olfactory, and so on) associated with the different sense modalities. These include, among other things, aches, pains, tickles, thirst, hunger, and feelings of sexual excitement. Perhaps their introspectively salient quality is the defining characteristic of this peculiar variety of mental things. For instance, a French horn's sound and appearance are completely unrelated. Even though they are all the same thing (a French horn), if the sensation is associated – as it usually is in the case of perceptual awareness – with the way things sound, look, and feel, then these sensations will each have an intrinsic, introspectively obvious quality that sets them apart from one another. This is quite unlike such propositional attitudes as thought, belief, judgment, and knowledge [Blackburn 2005: 370]. It is important to remember that beliefs differ solely in terms of their content – the proposition believed – and not in terms of how they “feel” to the individual who holds them. In terms of truth, sense perception is therefore equally prone to perceptual error.

iii. **Intuition:** Initially, intuition was thought to be a direct relationship between the mind and something abstract and so imperceptible to the senses,

similar to visual sight. Abstract items like qualities or facts are viewed as intuitions since they are not amenable to calculation or sense-based analysis. However, this must be contrasted from an alleged pure receiving of “raw data” from the senses; the intuiting is presupposed by and therefore cannot depend upon sensory experience. Kant talks of our intuitively seeing space and time in a way that is direct and completely free from any mediation by the intellect. Therefore, it is a reliable source of knowledge and truth, as shown by Immanuel Kant and by Rene Descartes in the *Cogito*.

The Problem of Certainty

The pursuit of certainty took up a considerable portion of the epistemological landscape. This is most likely due to the presumption that all of our claims to knowing are dubious in the absence of a basis for assurance. The world cannot be what it is naturally, scientifically, and technologically unless some things are certain, as is believed to be the case. Nothing can even be considered plausible. Sometimes the word ‘certain’ is used as a synonym for ‘necessary’ or for ‘a priori’ [Ayer 1986: 41]. In other words, they are not essential in the same way as a priori statements are, and all of them can be rejected without contradicting one another. For instance, it is argued that no empirical statement is certain. As a result, some philosophers hold a priori assertions up as the gold standard, following in the footsteps of Leibniz, who equated all true truths with those found in formal logic or pure mathematics; or, following in the footsteps of existentialists, who saw the impossibility of doing so as tragic. Additionally, the fact that all empirical claims are tentative and that, even when accurate, they can be refuted without contradicting oneself, is a need in and of itself.

A claim is considered to be certain in another sense when it is undeniable. Whenever it is error-free, that is. When there is no room for question, someone is certain of something. Thus, it is conceivable for someone to believe they are certain of something when uncertainty can actually exist. Descartes defends the contentious belief that scepticism will only be vanquished if genuine certainty is available in his First Meditation by suggesting that much of what we typically believe to be certain is actually debatable. Knowledge that is completely error-proof or the mental attitude of being confident is an example of certainty. In an effort to distinguish between knowledge and certainty, certainty is a characteristic of beliefs from an epistemological perspective. In other words, certainty is the single epistemic attribute of knowledge and the ultimate type of knowledge that cannot be mistaken.

However, the issue of knowledge’s certainty is a significant one in philosophical research. This fact led to the act of wonder which is believed to stimulate the Ionian philosophers in the first instance, led philosophy through many ages to its present position [Okoye 2011: 34]. Many ancient philosophers

became sceptics because they had trouble solving this significant knowledge gap between the knowing subject (man) and the objects. Scepticism is believed to cast doubt on the very viability of true and unquestionable knowledge, which undoubtedly infuriated many thinkers. Some established theories of knowledge have been constructed in order to address the issue of certainty. The axiomatic system of geometry, according to Plato, is the ideal representation of some types of knowledge. Once the geometric deductions method and the axioms are accepted, knowledge must still be proven or proved. By the time Gottlob Frege, Kurt Gödel, Charles Sanders Peirce, and others discovered minute flaws in Aristotle's flawless system in the nineteenth century, logic had advanced to a condition that had endured for more than two thousand years. It is widely held that certainty about the real world is a failed historical enterprise [Peat 2002].

According to Reed Baron, certainty is a belief's epistemic feature, just like knowledge. Certainty is a derivative of epistemic properties of subjects in the sense that S is certain that p in the event that S believes that p to be certain. Although some philosophers believed that there was no distinction between certainty and knowledge, it has been more and more popular to do so. On this conception, then, certainty is either the highest form of knowledge or is the only epistemic property superior to knowledge [Baron 2011]. In order to prevent error, the ancient philosophers sought assurance in their knowledge. It makes sense why Plato said that ignorance is a major factor in people being tricked in ancient times. He made this clearer in his 'allegory of the cave' where he dismisses erroneous knowledge as shadows and upholds the need for more certain knowledge [Okoye 2011: 34]. Modern Plato or Platonists liken his Cave to an underground movie theatre where viewers witness the shadows the movie casts as it moves in front of a light behind them. The film itself is only an image of 'real' things and events in the world outside the cinema [Stumpf 1994: 594]. For the movie, Plato had to use the more clumsy machinery of a procession of man-made objects carried on the heads of extras, which allowed for the movement of the objects and the sounds that the inmates could hear as an echo. These people's shadows are shielded from the Cave's wall by the parapet.

However, in order to understand that certainty actually presents an issue, we need to consider whether we can be certain of each of the following claims and whether we can be confident of them in distinct ways:

- a. $2 + 2 = 4$
- b. In fourteen hundred and ninety-two Columbus sailed the ocean blue.
- c. I exist
- d. You exist
- e. The sun will rise tomorrow
- f. Every event must have a cause [Miller, & Jensen 1998: 197].

This knowledge analysis aims to demonstrate that it is indisputable that scepticism can exist only in the presence of certainty. The study presented above demonstrates that the concept of certainty is not a straightforward one. The pursuit of absolute knowing certainty is greatly challenged by scepticism as a philosophical philosophy. The sceptics reject the idea that epistemic claims might be certain. In some ways, the entire goal of traditional epistemology is to respond to this sceptic's challenge by demonstrating the viability of knowledge. Scepticism as an idea connotes the critical spirit: the tendency of not being easily satisfied with simple or superficial evidence and striving to accept only incorrigible beliefs that are absolutely certain [Owolabi 2000: 55]. Owolabi opines that "it is difficult to begin to describe the features of scepticism because sceptics have diverse reasons and objectives for questioning and denying the certainty and objectivity of epistemic claims [Miller, & Jensen 1998: 198].

Locke aimed at more modest objective of "clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish on the way to knowledge" [Stumpf 1994: 208]. But in the process of 'clearing' and 'removing' the rubbish on the way to knowledge, Locke hit upon a bold and original interpretation of how the mind works and from this, describes the kind and extent of knowledge we can expect from the human mind. According to Locke's conclusion, our knowledge is constrained by our experience and/or by any other factor. In this sense, the phenomenalist stands in for the idea that things like colours, noises, pains, pleasures, location, succession, and the like are more than just collections of sensations. In front of Hume's phenomenism, these two philosophical foundations were suddenly reduced to dust. One may be justified in considering Hume to be a sceptic. Hume's scepticism is the sort of skepticism which denies the knowledge of metaphysical principles and relations as possible; that is, "philosophical scepticism" [Stumpf 1994: 191]

Furthermore, the sceptic might convince us that we do not truly understand the veracity of even our most banal and superficial worldviews. The results are counterintuitive and shocking: since all we really know are that we are conscious of certain images and ideas, and that we have no reason to believe anything actually exists outside our minds [Guignon 2010]. For all we know, what we call 'reality' may be nothing other than this play of mental contents dancing through our consciousness. In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant addresses the consequences that seem to emerge from this sceptical puzzle. He claims that "it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us... must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof [Kant 1963]. In order to put an end to this crisis for philosophy, Kant launches a "refutation of idealism" of Descartes' and Berkeley's "problematic

idealism". According to Kant, Berkeley's idealism is simple to deal with, but Cartesian scepticism merits special attention. According to Kant, Descartes holds that "there is only one empirical assertion that is indubitably certain, namely, that 'I am,'" so that "the existence of objects in space outside us" is merely doubtful and indemonstrable". The proof that objects exist "outside us" is supposed to be achieved by showing that "inner experience is possible only through outer experience in general". The goal is to demonstrate the existence of an external world by showing that the discovery of the certain and indubitable "I am" is possible only if there is knowledge of things in the external world. Furthermore, Kant's concern with what he calls Descartes' "problematic idealism" is indicative of the emerging centrality of scepticism and the problem of knowledge in eighteenth-century philosophical thought. The question is posed whether what is given in "inner experience" such as the ideas, perceptions, and representations found inside consciousness- in fact provides us with true knowledge about what is "outside us"- that is, such things like the objects we believe to exist in the external world. However, the demand for a proof of the existence of objects outside the mind Kant regards as "reasonable and in accordance with a thorough and philosophical mode of thought" [Stumpf 1994: 193].

In conclusion, the desire of man to acquire knowledge tends towards obtaining nothing but the truth and certainty. The problem of epistemic claim is geared to know which statement is true and false and the criteria of affirming true epistemic property. In this paper, effort is made to solidify the epistemic foundation upon which human knowledge is grounded and firm hypotheses are built which are indubitable and devoid of error. Using Plato and Descartes hypotheses, showcase that a justified true belief and Methodic doubt are rudiments for obtaining true knowledge in epistemology. The idea to justify our claims to knowledge was brought to light by Descartes through his Methodic doubt questioning his very existence as a thinking being and doubted the existence of the external world. This process of doubt resulted in his famous dictum "cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I exist". With this dictum, he was able to establish not only his existence as a thinking person but also proof beyond reasoning doubt that the external world exist and erect unshaking structure for all human knowledge. This is to affirm that scepticism is not totally designed to destroy true knowledge but to create a solid foundation for human cognitive knowledge in epistemic justification.

Kinds of Certainty

There are different categories of certainty. When a subject feels utterly convinced of the reality of a belief, it is said to be psychologically certain. In this context, certainty is comparable to incorrigibility, which is a characteristic of a conviction. The distinction between psychological certainty

and incorrigibility must be made, though. Even if a belief is incorrigible, it can still be certain in some ways. This might occur, for instance, when the person rejects a (previously) certain view after being presented with some very strong contrary evidence. A belief might also be unchangeable without being psychologically certain, as well.

Epistemic certainty is the second sort of certainty. A belief is deemed to be certain in this sense when it possesses the highest epistemic standing conceivable. Although it is not necessary, epistemic certainty is frequently accompanied by psychological certainty. It is possible for a subject to hold a belief that has the highest level of epistemic standing while being completely oblivious of this.

The Relevance of Epistemic Justification to Knowledge

In the *Meditation*, Rene Descartes sums up his Fourth meditation with the claim that attending to what he understands clearly and distinctly will allow him “to avoid ever going wrong” and also to enable him “to arrive at the truth” [Descartes 1984]. In the same vein, Roderick M. Chisholm opines that “if I want to believe what is true and not to believe what is false then the most reasonable thing for me to do is to believe what is justified and not to believe what is not justified” [Chisholm 1982: 89]. Paul Moser also characterizes epistemic justification as “essentially related to the so-called cognitive goal of truth, in so far as individual belief is epistemically justified only if it is appropriately directed toward the goal of truth” [Moser, 2002]. Lehrer, who holds that accepting something for the purpose of attaining truth and avoiding error is a requisite to knowledge, maintains that “a concern for truth and nothing but the truth drives the engine of justification” [Keith 1990].

In discussing our desire for truth acquisition, Alvin Goldman posits that “true belief is a prime determinant of intellectual value, and in particular, a critical value for justified knowledge” [Goldman 1979: 12]. Ernest Sosa, who optimizes that knowledge requires true belief arising from intellectual virtue, characterizes an intellectual virtue as “a quality bound to help maximize one’s surplus of truth over error” [Sosa 1991: 184]. He conceives “a teleological conception of intellectual virtue, characterizes an intellectual virtue, the relevant end being a proper relation to the truth” [Sosa 1991: 184]. Plantinga in another vein holds that positive epistemic status (warrant) is conferred “by one’s cognitive faculties working properly, or working according to the design plan insofar that segment of the design plan is aimed at producing true beliefs” [Plantinga 1998: 21]. The proponents of many epistemological stances, including Foundationalism, Fallibilism, Coherentism, Reliabilism, Contextualism, Virtue Epistemology, and Proper-function Epistemology, are all responsible for the notions that have been explored.

Nevertheless, beliefs, truth, certainty, and other epistemic concepts are frequently used to describe knowledge, the preeminent epistemic concept. The concept of S's being justified in believing P is the specifically epistemic component of knowledge. Undoubtedly, the idea of justification stems from epistemology. In fact, the goal of epistemology is primarily about providing a theory of justification once an account of knowledge is at hand. Such a theory is expected to address two issues:

(i.) It should explain the concept of justification and what constitutes a justified belief;

(ii.) It should include justification principles that outline the circumstances in which certain types of beliefs are acceptable.

When discussing what knowledge is with Theaetetus in Plato's *Theaetetus*, Socrates appears to have come to the conclusion that "knowledge is true opinion" in their final accord. This appears to be a clear difficulty of mixing a false opinion with knowledge. Thus, only a true opinion, in this context, will qualify as parameter of knowledge.

This further probe into the problem of truth which can be categorized into three forms with question of facts namely:

1. What is truth?
2. What is the criterion of truth?
3. How do we know the truth?

By way of analysis, the first problem leads to the second problem and the third problem raises a fundamental problem of knowledge. That is, how do we know what we claim to know and ascertain its truth? Do we have the truth-goal? Do we desire to believe truths and not to believe falsehoods?

Novelty

Epistemology has been greatly challenged by the fact that we value knowledge more than merely genuine belief. One could respond by pointing out that the knowledge objective includes the truth goal and that possessing the truth goal in this sense suffices for the theoretical goals that the truth is required for in epistemology.

As a result, another issue with truth is that we typically don't want it for its own sake but rather because we think that holding genuine views will boost our chances of achieving our other goals. The idea that truth is the epistemic objective does not, however, imply that we are motivated by truth solely for its own sake. It claims that any further objectives for which we might have a desire for truth must be outside the purview of epistemology. These additional objectives will be moral or practical, that is, they won't add anything to the theory of epistemology per se.

Conclusion

The problems of truth and certainty remain foundational in epistemology. While truth seeks an objective correspondence between belief and reality, certainty deals with the subjective assurance of knowledge. Modern epistemology often accepts fallibilism, the notion that human knowledge, though sometimes reliable is never beyond all doubt. To this end, epistemology continues to explore how we can have reasonable confidence in what we believe, even if absolute certainty remains elusive.

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Фунілайо Арінола Аде-Алі. Про проблему істини та визначеності в епістемології: концептуальне розгляд

Актуальність. Два центральні та взаємопов'язані питання в епістемології – це проблема істини та проблема визначеності. Вони захопили філософські дебати щодо того, чи можуть люди знати щось з абсолютною визначеністю та що означає, що переконання чи твердження є істинним. **Метою** цієї статті є уточнення проблеми можливості істини та визначеності як викликів епістемічного обґрунтування в сучасній епістемології. **Методи.** Кінцевим рівнем знання є визначеність, яка демонструє, що твердження є епістемічно істинним та значущим, якщо воно не містить помилок. Стверджується, що пропозиційне твердження має реальну, обґрунтовану епістемічну характеристику, якщо його можна довести як істинне. З цієї точки зору, визначеність часто пояснюється з точки зору незаперечної істини, як у формулюванні Декарта «Я мислю, отже, я існую». Емпірики Локк та Юм стверджують, що знання походить з чуттєвого досвіду, який є помилковим. Кант далі підтверджував, що наші знання починаються з досвіду; вони структуровані апіорними категоріями розуму. Він стверджував, що достовірність існує в царині явищ (того, що нам здається), а не ноуменів (речей у собі). У сучасній перспективі, за Поппером, все людське знання підлягає помилкам та перегляду, і те, що вважається достовірним, залежить від контексту дослідження. **Новизна.** Якщо люди мотивовані істиною виключно заради неї самої, то це стверджує, що будь-які подальші цілі, для яких вони можуть прагнути істини, повинні бути поза цариною епістемології. **Висновок.** Завданням епістемології є узгодження суб'єктивного переконання з об'єктивною істиною. Отже, найважливішими стовпами, необхідними для доведення переконливості твердження про знання в епістемічному обґрунтуванні, є істина та достовірність.

Ключові слова: істина, достовірність, *cogito*, апіорі, скептицизм, помилковість.

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