Andrii Abdula

Educational guidelines in the process of implementation of rational principles and the value preconditions of the open society

The theoretical model of the open society was and remains a fruitful way of reflecting the essential links within a democratic society. Analyzing this concept from its rationality, the author tries to highlight its fundamental principles and determine their impact on the form and content of the functioning of education.

The article offers a view of K. Popper’s “open society” as a way to implement the principles of criticism (critical methodology), of (potential) fallibility, egalitarianism (pluralism) as principles of social rationality. The connection between these principles, moral obligations, and the humanistic theory of justice is emphasized. Their socio-philosophical and epistemological realization in the context of educational issues is covered. The paper considers problems of state intervention in educational processes, the definition of educational goals, the methodology of social reforms (including educational reforms).

The article also outlines the problem of defining the boundaries of regulation of the educational process in the value system of open society. This discussion is interpreted in terms of the theory of rationality as an attempt to avoid the extremes of absolutism (dogmatism) and relativism. Emphasis is placed on the prospects of using the critical-rationalist methodology, in the context of education and development of skills necessary for participation in democratic processes.

Particular attention is paid to the problematic aspects of the implementation of the rational principles and values of the open society in the educational environment and in the process of reforming the education system in the absence of a constant critical and rationalist tradition. The paper emphasizes the importance of critical thinking in the prospect of implementing these transformations.

The importance of scientific, logical and methodological, psychological and pedagogical aspects of critical thinking is emphasized; the author tries to comprehend the problematic aspects of the implementation of these principles in the process of implementing reforms in the field of education.

Keywords: open society, critical thinking, rationality, education system, methodology of social reforms, philosophy of education.

Introduction

K. Popper’s “the open society” is a theoretical social-philosophical model that reflects a democratic society, its structure, the mechanism of development, and the ways of functioning. Introduced in Karl Popper’s “The Open Society and Its Enemies” in the mid-twentieth century, this concept goes beyond narrow socio-philosophical discourse because it also symbolizes the struggle against totalitarianism (with philosophical systems and worldviews based on it or contribute to its spreading) [Popper 2013]. At the same time, the open society retains its importance in the context of considering more universal issues, because it represents the theory of rationality in its scientific, socio-political, ethical, and other aspects [Jarvie 1999]. The topic of education is important among these issues. It is regarded as an integral part of the modern discursive space of the open society not only in theoretical but also in practical dimensions [Bailey 2018].

Among the researchers who have paid considerable attention to the issue of education in the context of the concept of the open society are the following: R. Bailey [2018], who tried to construct a holistic theory of education; J. Agassi [1999] and J. Swann [2009], who offered a practically oriented approach and focused on creative learning free from dogmatism; R. Swartz [1999], who addresses the problem of the relation between education and freedom; C. M. Lam [2013], who attempts to adapt Popper’s philosophy to national tradition; S. Chitpin [2016], who analyzes key aspects of the introduction of Popper’s system into education, K. Salamun [1999], who draws attention to the prospects of political education in the open society, and many other researchers. However, as Richard Bailey points out, although the researchers refer to many aspects of Popper’s philosophy, such as Popper’s early meta-scientific approach, the multiculturalism of the open society, epistemology and the theory of three worlds, they often prefer the practical dimension of the problem [Bailey 2018: 4].

Therefore, in our paper, we would like not only to consider the theoretical basis of the Popper model of the open society and its educational component but also try to analyze the perspectives of the use of rationalist methodology in educational transformations of societies, which lack the established critical rationalist tradition.

Considering this topic, we will accomplish several tasks. Firstly, we will try to determine the initial principles and theoretical preconditions for the functioning of the open society. Secondly, we will demonstrate a link between these principles and specific educational guidelines or standards. Thirdly, we will outline the prospects for implementing these guidelines in today’s educational environment. Finally, we will analyze the prospects for implementing the rational principles of the open society in the context of reforming the post-totalitarian education system.
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Particular attention is paid to the problematic aspects of the implementation of the rational principles and values of the open society in the educational environment and in the process of reforming the education system in the absence of a constant critical and rationalist tradition. The paper emphasizes the importance of critical thinking in the prospect of implementing these transformations.

The importance of scientific, logical and methodological, psychological and pedagogical aspects of critical thinking is emphasized; the author tries to comprehend the problematic aspects of the implementation of these principles in the process of implementing reforms in the field of education.

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Initial principles and theoretical preconditions for the functioning of the open society

One of the main, if not decisive, characteristics of the open society is its rationality. This idealized type of society includes democracy, science, education, ethics, as the process and result of what K. Popper calls the “attitude of reasonableness” [Popper 2013: 431]. Therefore, in our opinion, it would be methodologically justifiable to consider the principles of the open society as universal principles of rationality, fundamental to activity and thinking (see [Abdula 2016] and the author’s other papers on this topic). K. Popper did not develop this model solely as the theory of rationality, because he entrusted on it ideological functions, and somewhat weakened it, laying in the basis of the open society the possibility of moral choice between reason and non-reason [Popper 2013: 437]. However, his followers, such as W. Bartley [1993] and H. Albert [2016], regarded it as a theory and methodology of rationality. On the other hand, the rationality offered by K. Popper is viewed as humanistic rationality that contrasts with the functional, formal rationality that is associated exclusively with efficiency. What are the (rational) principles underlying this model?

The most fundamental of these principles would be the principle of criticism (critical methodology). K. Popper’s philosophy is generally known as “critical rationalism”, which is understood as “an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience” [Popper 2013: 431]. That is, it is not only the argumentation that implies criticism but also the ability to respond to it and learn from criticism. The second principle is the principle of (potential) fallibility. According to it, any person can make mistakes, but due to criticism, these errors can be corrected [Popper 2013: 442]. This approach could be broadly compared to Descartes’ “radical doubt”, but Popper appeals not to supernatural entities but to other people without whom the progress of knowledge would not be possible. The last thesis is reflected in the third principle called the principle of egalitarianism or pluralism. According to this principle, reasonableness exists through the activity of many people, so everyone can be listened to and has the right to defend their position [Popper 2013: 442-443]. This concept of mind also implies certain moral obligations: to protect social freedom and freedom of thought (which requires the availability of appropriate social institutions and ways to improve them – social engineering), to provide opportunities for interaction and communication, the presence of “a common language of reason” [Popper 2013: 443]. Egalitarianism, as a requirement of impartiality and equality, also forms the basis of a “the humanistic theory of justice”, which presupposes the principle of equality, that is, the exclusion of “natural” privileges; the principle of individualism as anti-collectivism; the task of the state to protect the freedom of its citizens [Popper 2013: 91].

Principles of the open society and specific educational guidelines

How do K. Popper’s principles correlate with education? Before answering this question, it should be mentioned that the traditional notion of Popper’s philosophy and methodology involves at least two dimensions: socio-philosophical and epistemological. Although the existence of the theory of rationality or universal rationality principles obviously implies their common ground, the first of these spheres of philosophical inquiry involves considering education as a particular social system (social institution), while the second one refers directly to the problems of cognition. For “The Open Society and Its Enemies” is primarily a socio-philosophical book, the issues of education (such as ethics) are considered from the socio-philosophical viewpoint. Education is quite often considered in the context of more general or relevant themes. However, Popper does not miss the epistemological issue, which also reveals the essence of the open society and its rationality.

One of the key topics, when K. Popper addresses the problem of education, is the prospect of the state guideline toward seeking (training, upbringing) the best ruler or leader. Does the education system work to achieve this task? According to Popper, such an attitude is wrong for many reasons. Firstly, it contradicts the principles of criticism and intellectual independence, because such selection destroys the identity and initiative of the leaders and encourages mediocrity [Popper 2013: 127]. Secondly, the guideline also focuses on finding a “stable” social situation that preserves or even denies change and progress [Popper 2013: 128]. Finally, identifying altruism with collectivism, it burdens educational institutions with functions that are not peculiar to them [Popper 2013: 121].

We need to emphasize that considering this point of view in the context of the criticism of Plato’s philosophy, Popper admits its significant impact on the European education system. However, this influence is even more relevant to the Ukrainian education system, which cannot get rid of the influence of not only the Platonic but also the Hegel-Marxist components of the totalitarian paradigm. The task of “looking for the best”, as K. Popper admitted, leads to devastating consequences because it encourages to learning for the sake of a career, instead of developing a student’s inclinations for learning and research [Popper 2013: 128].

Another important theme, which is largely related to the previous topic and considered by the philosopher, is the problem of state control of education. Does a state have to regulate education? If the answer is positive, to what extent does this control have to be provided? Answering this question, K. Popper tries to avoid the extremes, because, in his opinion, the state should at least provide a protective function regarding the citizens’ ability of self-development and receiving education [Popper 2013: 124]. On the other hand,
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the authoritarian policies that suppress intellectual freedom and oblige the state to control the processes of consciousness formation and science teaching are unacceptable [Popper 2013: 124]. Such policy contrasts with the Socratic spirit of inquiry, its awareness of one’s ignorance and readiness to learn and correct mistakes, so the policy causes dogmatic self-satisfaction and complacency [Popper 2013: 123]. Thus, the problem of state intervention in education arises as a boundary question between freedom and security, since “any kind of freedom is clearly impossible unless it is guaranteed by the state” [Popper 2013: 106].

One of the key features of Popper’s understanding of the open society is the denial of collectivism and groups in general, as certain units or self-sufficient entities. Therefore, the philosopher, while addressing the issue of collectivist youth movements, draws attention to their tribalistic (anti-individualistic) nature, which poses the potential danger of the spread of irrational ideas among young people [Popper 2013: 637]. Indeed, if a democratic state encourages such movements, does it not promote the rooting of anti-egalitarian tendencies opposed to the rational principles on which it should rely? Obviously, anyone, who deals with a totalitarian heritage and its irrational content, experiences relevant symptoms in the domain of education. However, they extend far beyond the educational sphere. The “romantic” (but essentially irrational) spirit, which is the basis of such phenomena, is also present in the process of education, in particular, where its value component is realized [Popper 2013: 481]. However, as K. Popper admits, the real purpose of education is not to impose on the students the corresponding values, but rather not to do harm to them, to arouse their interest in values, and to give the students everything they need for an independent life [Popper 2013: 481]. Therefore, he concludes: “Instead, ‘higher’ aims are the fashion, aims which are typically romantic and indeed nonsensical, such as ‘the full development of the personality’” [Popper 2013: 481].

On the other hand, when it comes to the values of rationality, then obviously the best way to illustrate them is to turn to the scientific method and the history of science. This will demonstrate how effectively one can implement intellectual virtues, such as respect for the truth, independence from authority, the ability to learn from one’s mistakes and improve oneself through criticism [Popper 2013: 643]. According to Popper, the trial and error method is the only rational method that provides development in the social, scientific or any other domain. Through small steps, “gradual social engineering”, we can reform social institutions by solving specific, local problems. At the same time, global, radical, “utopian” transformations can be dangerous because the cost of the error may be too high [Popper 2013: 149]. This method also emphasizes that science is not a collection of (final) knowledge. It is rather a competition of hypotheses, and its progress is the promotion of bold ideas and their refutation by experience [Popper 2013: 649]. K. Popper’s view of the science and rationality that he develops in many of his epistemological works can be illustrated by the following thought: “What we should do, I suggest, is to give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge, and admit that all knowledge is human; that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes; that all we can do is to grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach” [Popper 1962: 29-30]. S. Chiptin states as follows: “Popper’s theory of learning posits that learning embodies the same process as problem-solving, that is the process of trial and error elimination” [Chiptin 2016: 192].

What significance do these ideas have for contemporary education? To what extent are they relevant and can they be put into practice? Finally, to what extent do the open society and its educational subsystems correlate with the real society (and with some specific types of societies, including post-totalitarian societies)? Answering these questions, one can say that any idealized system, the system of ideas or principles arises concerning the existing state of affairs only by a certain guideline, which is unlikely to be finally realized. Even if there is a reason to speak about progress in trying to reform or to act “rationally”, reality always leaves a significant element of uncertainty, potential errors, the presence of which attests to the very idea of progress. Therefore, the attempts to implement K. Popper’s ideas on how to approach the rationalist ideal, give rise to numerous discussions among those philosophers and educators who have chosen the path of critical rationalism. These discussions are particularly relevant nowadays when the attitude to rationality seems to be again too shaky all over the world, and education continues to function as a dogmatized or irrational system.

One such topic for discussion is the problem of defining the regulation boundaries of the educational process. This discussion can also be interpreted in terms of the rationality theory as an attempt to avoid the extremes of absolutism (dogmatism) and relativism. In particular, attempting to rethink K. Popper’s ideas and focusing on the creative dimension of the critical dimension of learning. J. Swann contrasts it with formal education: “Formal education worldwide is largely controlled and organised by people who wish, perhaps for all the right reasons, to instruct, people who are preoccupied with a desire that children, adolescents and older students, learn specific things, things that they, the controllers and organisers, deem it important to teach” [Swann 2009: 386]. It can be assumed that those who control formal education are often not interested in Popper’s ideas or inclined to use them (especially in some post-totalitarian social environment). However, even in the context of an “open” understanding of education, creativity, and freedom are not always considered to take the first place. According to the researcher, there are at least two directions in which critical-rationalist directions are implemented. Firstly, it is a person-oriented approach to
the authoritarian policies that suppress intellectual freedom and oblige the state to control the processes of consciousness formation and science teaching are unacceptable [Popper 2013: 124]. Such policy contrasts with the Socratic spirit of inquiry, its awareness of one’s ignorance and readiness to learn and correct mistakes, so the policy causes dogmatic self-satisfaction and complacency [Popper 2013: 123]. Thus, the problem of state intervention in education arises as a boundary question between freedom and security, since “any kind of freedom is clearly impossible unless it is guaranteed by the state” [Popper 2013: 106].

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learning that presupposes, for example, the students’ direct involvement in the preparation of curriculum. Secondly, there is an approach focused on the critical discussion of important public topics [Swann 2009: 386]. It can be added that the second approach is more traditional as it focuses on a certain “external” theory of critical thinking, while the first approach requires from the students to have more autonomy and creativity, but the first approach gives them more freedom.

K. Popper’s viewpoint concerning this issue is characterized in the following way: the teacher has to critically discuss with students their learning problems, at the same time acting as the initiator, facilitator and regulator of the discussion [Lam 2013: 53]. A quite illustrate example is the description of K. Popper’s interaction with his students, as opposed to how one of his followers, Joseph Agassi, worked with them: “The deep disagreement between Popper and Agassi appears to be that Popper thought that students are not, generally speaking autonomous, and as a consequence they have to be taught initially rather dogmatically in the hope that they will ultimately rebel and gain autonomy. Agassi for his part thought that dogmatism should have no place in education at all” [Winchester 2017: 289]. Indeed, J. Agassi writes that teachers and coaches often become slaves to the tradition, cannot break away from it, and therefore, they consider themselves to be brilliant, so they regard themselves as superior to the students. The reasons for this are to be found in ignorance, authoritarian teaching, and anti-democratic authoritarian philosophy [Agassi 1999: 72]. However, does anti-dogmatism turn into relativism?

One can argue that having a system of rules or laws (concerning education), even if this system viewed as a consequence of embodying the principles of rationality, is a necessary evil that reflects, as K. Popper puts it, a “strain of civilization” without which the existence of a rationally oriented society is impossible [Popper 2013: 188]. At the same time, this system is generally much more irrational than it seems at first glance. That is especially true for post-totalitarian countries, especially Ukraine, where the subsystems of society have inherited significant irrational elements, which have acquired a scientific basis. These systems function in such a way that “dialectical”, speculative “orders” are served by formal structures that ensure their implementation. In addition, due to their “dialectical” nature, they successfully avoid transformations or adapt by simulating them [Popper 1962].

In such circumstances, the task of the teacher may be regarded as to minimize the consequences of the formal or irrational side of the functioning of this system, and, on the other hand, to do everything to implement the principles of critical rationality. Obviously, the latter should be done based on the available possibilities and the state of social, political and individual-psychological preconditions, reducing the “pressure” on the student according to the real possibilities, by gradual steps.

The realization of these and similar tasks is also associated with the need to nurture and develop the skills necessary to participate in the democratic life of the country [Lam 2013: 49-50]. For example, it is important, to recognize undemocratic schemes and patterns of thought that may be considered as a precondition for new authoritarian practices [Salamun 1999: 83]. As K. Salamun admits, even after the collapse of totalitarian ideological systems, there are at least three new types of anti-democratic ideologies: aggressive nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and modernized authoritarianism [Salamun 1999: 83]. Obviously, each of these types, or even their synthesis, creates not only an external but also an internal danger to the open society. To this typology we would also add a post-totalitarian model, which is based on simulations and imitations of basic democratic procedures and the following principles: free elections, distribution of state power, freedom of speech, etc. The post-totalitarian model must be prevented by appropriately trained citizens who can “think critically”. Matthew Lipman notes: “I would say that the role of critical thinking is defensive: to protect us from being coerced or brainwashed into believing what others want us to believe without our having an opportunity to inquire for ourselves” [Lipman 2003: 47]. After all, even in societies that strive for “openness”, there are always, political, economic, military and other forces that are directed against a person [Lipman 2003].

In our opinion, the expression of “thinking critically” means that we need to use scientific methodological guidance in problem-solving (trial and error), which relies on the principles of rationality stated above. At the same time, one may ask whether the concept of “thinking” covers a larger range of phenomena. K. Popper emphasized that categories such as “rationalism”, “reason”, and similar concepts have a quiet ambiguous interpretation [Popper 2013: 430]. In addition to scientific and logical and methodological, the researchers also consider the psychological and pedagogical aspect of critical thinking [Kozachenko 2017]. In this aspect we concern the formation of a persons’ certain characteristics, which regulate behavior and thinking, allow to carry out “conscious control over the performance of intellectual activity” [Kozachenko 2017: 165-166]. It involves the motivational sphere: personal activity, epistemological optimism, desire for self-realization, self-affirmation, etc. and emotional-volitional sphere: will, attention, perseverance, purposefulness, etc. [Kozachenko 2017: 166]. Psychological knowledge can become an important component of “learning democracy” because democratic discussions are often accompanied by negative emotions that include such elements as desire (to achieve a certain result), conflict (between participants), pressure (in the decision-making process) [Lam 2013: 51]. At the same time, attention should be paid to the positive side of “critical training”, which can and should be an important precondition for any training and activity, as it promotes rapid rational learning, independent thinking and produces positive results [Segre 2009: 389].
learning that presupposes, for example, the students’ direct involvement in the preparation of curriculum. Secondly, there is an approach focused on the critical discussion of important public topics [Swann 2009: 386]. It can be added that the second approach is more traditional as it focuses on a certain “external” theory of critical thinking, while the first approach requires from the students to have more autonomy and creativity, but the first approach gives them more freedom.

K. Popper’s viewpoint concerning this issue is characterized in the following way: the teacher has to critically discuss with students their learning problems, at the same time acting as the initiator, facilitator and regulator of the discussion [Lam 2013: 53]. A quite illustrative example is the description of K. Popper’s interaction with his students, as opposed to how one of his followers, Joseph Agassi, worked with them: “The deep disagreement between Popper and Agassi appears to be that Popper thought that students are not, generally speaking autonomous, and as a consequence they have to be taught initially rather dogmatically in the hope that they will ultimately rebel and gain autonomy. Agassi for his part thought that dogmatism should have no place in education at all” [Winchester 2017: 289]. Indeed, J. Agassi writes that teachers and coaches often become slaves to the tradition, cannot break away from it, and therefore, they consider themselves to be brilliant, so they regard themselves as superior to the students. The reasons for this are to be found in ignorance, authoritarian teaching, and anti-democratic authoritarian philosophy [Agassi 1999: 72]. However, does anti-dogmatism turn into relativism?

One can argue that having a system of rules or laws (concerning education), even if this system viewed as a consequence of embodying the principles of rationality, is a necessary evil that reflects, as K. Popper puts it, a “strain of civilization” without which the existence of a rationally oriented society is impossible [Popper 2013: 188]. At the same time, this system is generally much more irrational than it seems at first glance. That is especially true for post-totalitarian countries, especially Ukraine, where the subsystems of society have inherited significant irrational elements, which have acquired a scientific basis. These systems function in such a way that “dialectical”, speculative “orders” are served by formal structures that ensure their implementation. In addition, due to their “dialectical” nature, they successfully avoid transformations or adapt by simulating them [Popper 1962].

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Critical thinking also requires reasonableness and transparency that could provide the opportunity for criticism. It can be mentioned that one of Popper's main arguments against dialectics is that by "combining" opposites, it allows one to evade criticism successfully [Popper 1962]. Possession of logical tools provides detection and overcoming of logical errors, establishes criteria of the correctness of reasoning, consistency, and confirmation [Kozachenko 2017: 169].

The importance of the logical component of critical thinking can be illustrated by the example of its implementation in the methodology of social transformation. It is well known that K. Popper favoured consistent social changes that were implemented gradually and predictably to transform social institutions. It is important to emphasize once again that this method involves critical discussions and questions of experience, that is, in essence, the implementation of the method of trial and error in the implementation of social reforms [Popper 2013: 340]. It is also a longitudinal method (based on experience and analysis) that allows seeing the undesirable effects and minimizing them, to make changes understandable, to reduce feelings of irrationality and insecurity [Popper 2013: 340]. At the same time, a social engineer is not necessarily obliged to limit himself to only "small" problems, he can be bold and solve complex problems (depending on the experience of such transformations) [Popper 2013: 603]. After all, Popper explicitly outlines that social engineering can be the object of education [Popper 2013: 149].

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However, if we consider Ukraine (or other countries of this type) as an example, then, obviously, the conditions of reform are different from those of "normal conditions" that are considered by Popper. We talk about a "reverse" reform that should correct the consequences of previous utopian social engineering. If one considers such utopian engineering as non-rational (from the critical-rationalist approach), choosing rationalism to try to "rebuild" the educational system on new foundations, the considerable scope of such reorganization is outlined. There is the following paradox: either one uses a moderate path, relies on time a modified and inefficient system for a long, or makes radical transformations that can lead to unpredictable consequences. Choosing the second path (the first option will be considered below in another context), we are once again captivated by utopian engineering. After all, it seems that such reform has a certain (utopian) purpose, which under any circumstances must be implemented. The attempt to try making it true while ignoring reality (facts) can lead to contradictory consequences (such as, in fact, an increase in bureaucracy as opposed to the declared liberal values, an increase in the teacher’s workload despite its declared decrease, etc.). The components of the reform and its results can become inconsistent with each other and with other systems of society. In such reforms, desirable things seem often to be true, and the links between the starting points and the conclusions have only an apparent justification. Moreover, the “critical discussions” and discussions that K. Popper insists on sometimes seem merely imitations, the result of which is known in advance, as a predetermined range of their participants and decision-makers.

In our opinion, to reduce the negative consequences of such transformations, it is critical thinking in its basic logical component that is necessary. After all, we emphasize that it requires the following logical skills: the ability to analyze facts, justify beliefs, make comparisons, evaluate arguments; ability to evaluate and analyze conclusions, ability to explain evidential, conceptual, methodological, and criterion considerations to support one’s judgments [Kozachenko 2017: 168].

As for the “scientific” characteristic of thinking, it can be interpreted quite broadly, that is, implemented not only in scientific research or social reform but also in everyday life, anywhere you need to think rationally. Therefore, the communicative aspect of critical thinking is significant. In a narrow sense, it implies a view of a particular scientific community, and in the wider sense, it means community of all rational people. We can agree with N. Kozachenko's opinion: “Critical, free-thinking and, moreover, scientific attitude cannot be implemented alone: it requires dialogue, addressing the historical roots of the problem, analyzing previous solutions and considering options offered by other participants of discussion” [Kozachenko 2017: 170].

The idea of addressing to the history of the problem in its broad sense raises questions about traditions and the relationship between them because the critical method is also a certain tradition associated with the “invention of critical thought” [Popper 2013: 619]. How can this tradition relate to other traditions that may be opposed to it? According to C. M. Lam critical thinking characterizing the open society can be seen as a second-order tradition, while there are always first-order traditions in any society, and they are objects of criticism and critical discussion [Lam 2013: 51]. Thus, it is possible to develop a critical tradition by comparing it with other cultural traditions, encouraging their revision, or at least recognizing the presence of alternative points of view [Lam 2013: 51]. C. M. Lam tries to contrast Confucianism and critical rationalism [Lam 2013: 54-57]. We may think about what kind of Ukrainian tradition can be taken as the basis of comparison with the methodology of critical transformations.

Most likely, the reformer in the national tradition, if he wants to limit himself to only moderate steps, will have to deal with a certain version of the command-administrative system and the system of values and guidelines of the
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Most likely, the reformer in the national tradition, if he wants to limit himself to only moderate steps, will have to deal with a certain version of the command-administrative system and the system of values and guidelines of the
“post-socialist” model. However, he is potentially the bearer of these values of the mentioned system, and that might be the obstacle, so his first step will be aware of these values, then criticize them, and after that, he can reexamine them. The scheme is too similar to dialectical, however, as K. Popper admits: “It can hardly be doubted that the dialectic triad describes fairly well certain steps in the history of thought, especially certain developments of ideas and theories, and of social movements which are based on ideas or theories” [Popper 1962: 313-314]. Then, everything will depend on the reformer, whether he is able to reconcile with the contradictions, or on the contrary, whether he will be able to reject the “thesis” or “antithesis” [Popper 1962: 313-314]. The question arises if there is a possibility of such a “pure” intrinsic denial of previous education and upbringing, taking into consideration the complex structure of a person’s mental life.

Even if one imagines that such a “purification” would be effective, reforms will probably be a matter of generations, because to the remnants of the old system will resist to the reformer not only in education, political or social but also in socio-psychological dimension. The complexity of the situation described above can be emphasized by the idea that in practice, it is difficult to follow critical directions (even in some progressive social environment), as opposed to what is suggested in theory. Some Kantian motives can be felt here, in the sense that it is necessary to recognize how difficult it is to be guided by a duty that mind imposes on a person. As Fred Eidlin admits, few Popperians have been able to practically adhere to the behavioural norms that follow from Popper’s philosophy, or conduct research and debate, agreeing with the Popper norms [Eidlin 1999: 204].

Moreover, when it comes to adapting a particular tradition to a critical-rationalist approach, in practice, such an adaptation will require rather “preserving” than “overcoming” contradictions. Even if a small step (phased engineering) resolves a minor problem, it will cause conflicts with other related systems that cannot be resolved at once. Thus, our reformer may find himself no longer a utopian engineer, but an irrationalist, who will be in a relational environment of contradictory traditions, semi-reforms, steps taken and only planned steps, etc. That makes one wonder whether a “reverse” engineering of communist ideals is possible at all, and whether it forces the difficult path of struggle that European civilization has undergone. The situation is complicated by the fact that revealing the true traditions, motives, values, and ideals of those who built the previous model, which needs to be gradually reformed, is quite complicated and such a rational reconstruction is hardly possible.

The constructive task of the reformer in such a situation, in our opinion, will be to find that difficult balance between large-scale changes and their gradualness and controllability. He also needs to look for those national centres of rationality and humanism that are present under all conditions in the cultural and scientific heritage of the people. Alongside the educational activities that will facilitate the emergence of new such centres, a clear link between them should be established and the general outline of the open society should be gradually drawn. An important role in this process must belong to philosophy, which is largely an experience of rationality and criticism. Therefore, the leading role in the transformation of society must be played by philosophical education, familiarity with logic and rationalist methodology.

Conclusion

To sum up, it can be mentioned that “The Open Society and Its Enemies” is a work that was written during one of humanity most terrible crises. This crisis gave every reason to question the values of civilization, and above all the values of rationality. However, despite all the turmoil of the twentieth century, the philosophy of K. Popper and his followers retains a rational, humanistic and at the same time optimistic motive that symbolizes what can be called “faith in reason” [Popper 2013: 460]. Faith in reason is a belief in the value of an open society and science, in egalitarianism as opposed to collectivism, and in altruism as opposed to selfishness. It is also a belief in the ability of humanity to acknowledge its imperfection and to learn by correcting its own mistakes. At the same time, education is one of the key components of an open society in which, and through which, the principles of rationality must be implemented. Popper’s idea is that the state should not so much declare certain “high aims” and values as interfering with learning, but the role of the teacher is rather the role of a mentor who encourages the student to direct his intellectual development. The education system itself must be designed in such a way that one of its priorities is the formation of critical thinking.

Considering the open society through the lenses of rationality principles, and turning to the educational form of their implementation, we tried to analyze the difficulties that not only the teacher but also the reformer (above all, in education) may face in the situation when changes need to be implemented in societies lacking a solidly critical and rationalist tradition. As we have mentioned, one of the main tasks of the teacher, in our opinion, should be to minimize, as far as possible, the irrational and formal pressure on the student. At the same time, the situation, in which a social engineer will find himself in such societies, will make him reach a difficult compromise between large-scale transformations (with due regard for critical thinking principles) and try to respond to the traditions or existing state of the society by finding them and simultaneously shaping stable rational basis.

In our opinion, this problem (and its aspect regarding the magnitude of transformations) remains relevant and needs considerable attention as more and more societies with different and often opposite traditions embark on the
Andrii Abdula. Educational guidelines in the process of implementation of rational...

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In our opinion, this problem (and its aspect regarding the magnitude of transformations) remains relevant and needs considerable attention as more and more societies with different and often opposite traditions embark on the
path of reason and openness. Thus, the current situation in Ukraine becomes more promising to the extent that the number of people belonging to the community of reasonableness increases.

References:
Андрий Абдула. Освітні орієнтири в процесі реалізації раціональних принципів та ціннісних переконань відкритого суспільства

Теоретична модель відкритого суспільства була та залишається плідним способом відображения сутнісних зв'язків демократичного суспільства. Аналізуючи цю концепцію з точки зору її раціональності автор намагається висвітлити її фундаментальні засади та визначити їх вплив на форму та зміст функціонування освіти.

У статті пропонується погляд на «відкрите суспільство» К. Поппера, як на спосіб реалізації принципів критики (критичності), потенційної підкресленості, плюрализму (гетерогенізму) як принципів соціальної раціональності. Підкреслюється зв'язок цих принципів з моральними зовнішніми та гуманістичною теорією справедливості. Висвітлюється їх соціально-філософська та епистемологічна реалізація в контексті освітньої проблематики. Розглядаються проблеми втручання держави в освітній процес, визначення цілей освіти, методології проведення соціальних реформ (у тому числі реформи освіти).

Розглядається також проблема визначення меж регулювання освітнього процесу в системі цінностей відкритого суспільства. Ця дискусія інтерпретується у термінах теорії раціональності, як спроба уніфікації відносин абсолютізму (догматизму) та релятивізму. Акцентується увага на перспективі використання критико-раціоналістичної методології, у контексті виховання та розуміння її основних напрямків, необхідних для участі в демократичних процесах.

Особлива увага приділяється проблемним аспектам реалізації раціональних принципів та ціннісних переконань відкритого суспільства в освітньому середовищі та у процесі реформування системи освіти в умовах відсутності стійкої критико-раціоналістичної традиції. Акцентується увага на значенні критичного мислення в перспективі реалізації цих перетворень. Підкреслюється значення наукового, логіко-методологічного та психологічного аспектів критичного мислення; автор намагається осмислити проблемні аспекти реалізації цих принципів у процесі здійснення реформ у сфері освіти.

Ключові слова: відкрите суспільство, критичне мислення, раціональність, система освіти, методологія соціальних реформ, філософія освіти.

Андрий Абдула. Образовательные ориентиры в процессе реализации принципов и ценностных предпосылок открытого общества

Теоретическая модель открытого общества была и остается плодотворным способом отображения сущностных связей демократического общества. Анализируя эту концепцию с точки зрения ее рацionalности, автор делает попытку рассмотреть ее сущностные принципы и определить их влияние на форму и содержание функционирования образования.

В статье предлагается взгляд на «открытое общество» К. Поппера, как на способ реализации принципов критики (критичности), потенциальной...
Ціннісний вимір освіти

В основу дискусії роботи частково вставає концепція освіти максимізації цінностей. Найважливішою є проблема розуміння істини, релігії, демократії, культури, догризання соціальними процесами в умовах глобалізації. Основою для цих процесів є ідеї та норми, які змогають вкінці дійти до багатьох людей і стимулює соціальні відносини. Однак, існують деякі проблеми з розумінням і використанням цих ідей та норм, що впливає на процеси соціального розвитку.

Ключові слова: вибір соціальних цінностей, розуміння істини, релігії, демократії, культури, догризання соціальними процесами в умовах глобалізації.